We discuss market games or linear production games with ÿnite sets of players. The representing distributions of initial assignments are assumed to have disjoint carriers. Thus, the agents decompose into ÿnitely many disjoint groups each of which hold a corner of the market. In such a market traditional solution concepts like the core tend to favor the short side of the market excessively. We exhibit a solution concept which is more sensitive with respect to the preventive power of the long side. Thereby, proÿts of the long side are now feasible. This concept is the modiÿed nucleolus or modiclus. Within certain limits, it predicts cartelization and assigns a "fair share" for cartels on the long side of the market. Also, it organizes the internal distribution for a speciÿc cartel according to the "contested garment solution" of Aumann-Maschler. ?
Introduction
Within this paper, we continue to explain the endogenous formation of cartels in large markets. The model is provided by a cooperative totally balanced game with a potentially large but ÿnite set of players or agents. Within this framework, we discuss the formation of cartels predicted by a point-valued solution concept, the modiÿed nucleolus or modiclus.
This concept respects the blocking power of a cartel: the result is not only in uenced by what a coalition of traders can attain but also what they can prevent others to achieve. The modiclus formalizes the idea of the preventive power of a coalition.
Formally, the tool to assess this preventive power of a coalition is the dual game. The dual game assigns to a coalition the complementary worth of the complementary coalition. Hence, if the complementary coalition is powerful then the original coalition is weak and vice versa.
Therefore, for market games with distinct separate corners, this concept assigns positive worth to the long side of the market.
Most solution concepts of cooperative game theory do not respect any bargaining achievement of the long side of the market, at least not when the game is large (i.e., in a replicated version or a nonatomic model).
We refer to a paper by Hart [3] . This author points out that the Walrasian equilibrium or the core are unable to predict the endogenous formation of cartels within corners of the market. Hart favors the vNM-stable set for his discussion. Indeed, this concept seems to be able to predict cartelization. A more recent result by Rosenm uller-Shitovitz [7] about the characterization of convex vNM-stable sets corroborates his analysis.
We believe that the success of the vNM-stable set is due to the external stability of this solution concept. External stability provides some preventive power for coalitions during the bargaining process.
In the present context the modiclus provides preventive forces for coalitions, because it involves the dual game. Let us shortly describe our concept. The framework is the one of cooperative game theory, which we introduce as follows.
Consider a coalitional game given by triple (I; P; C), here I is the (ÿnite) set of agents or players, P the power set of I , called system of coalitions and C : P → R; C(∅) = 0; a real-valued function on P, the coalitional function. The dual game is given by C ? (S) := C(I ) − C(I − S) (S ∈ P) (1) and re ects the preventive power of coalitions. The modiclus is a nucleolus type concept [10] . Recall the procedure that yields the nucleolus: for any preimputation x (i.e., x ∈ R I ; x(I ) = C(I )), one lists the excesses e(S; x; C) = C(S) − x(S) (reasons to complain) in a (weakly) decreasing order, say Â(x) := (: : : ; e(S; x; C); : : :):
Then the prenucleolus is the unique preimputation such that Â(•) is lexicographically minimal, i.e., Â( ) lexic Â(x) for all preimputations x:
In order to obtain the modiÿed nucleolus or modiclus , one lists bi-excesses e(S; x; C) − e(T; x; C) and proceeds accordingly. As di erences of excesses ("bi-excesses") are sums of excesses of the primal and dual game, the modiclus represents achievement powers and preventive powers of coalitions alike.
For further intuitive insight, it is useful to construct another game which incorporates C and C ? simultaneously. This game is the dual cover. Take two copies of the set of players or agents, say I 1; 2 = I × {0; 1}
and deÿne a game C: P 1; 2 → R on the coalitions of this set (the power sets are indexed canonically) via C(S + T ) := max{C(S) + C ? (T ); C(T ) + C ? (S)} (S ∈ P 0 ; T ∈ P 1 )
(we use + instead of ∪ for disjoint unions). The game C takes pairs of coalitions into account, in one of them players act "constructively" and in the other one "preventively." This game re ects the combined in uence of the game and its dual. Now, C is deÿned on I 1; 2 . We obtain a concept deÿned on the original set of players by taking the projection of the prenucleolus of the dual cover game on the original player set I . As it turns out, (see [14] ), this is the modiclus .
The analysis of the modiclus describes the exogenous or external bargaining process (between representatives of the cartels) as well as the endogenous (internal) bargaining process (inside a speciÿc cartel). In [8] we consider the case of uniformly distributed initial assignments. This model already exhibits economic relevance in particular with respect to the external bargaining process. Technically, it admits of easy and more direct proofs.
The internal bargaining process inside a cartel is a much more complicated matter. In corners with uniformly distributed initial assignments, the symmetry properties of the modiclus yield a symmetric payo . Hence, equal treatment prevails. However, in a corner with various initial assignments a serious problem arises: How should the internal bargaining process be captured? Therefore, we have to come up with a completely new approach which heavily rests on the (generalized) concept of reduced games (see Lemma 2.7).
Indeed, the modiclus is very sensitive towards the initial assignment. The internal bargaining process takes two "internal games" into account and carefully computes the resulting payo s. One of these games is the reduced game which results from the distribution obtained by the external bargaining process in the sense of Davis-Maschler [2] . The second game is even more interesting: It turns out that one has to consider a "contested garment game" as discussed by Aumann-Maschler [1] . In this game, the various members of a speciÿc cartel have certain claims which implicitly result from their ability to form e cient coalitions with players outside the cartel. These claims (like those in the contested garment game) are not totally realizable. The "estate," that is the assignment to the cartel by the external bargaining process, is limited and hence the coalitions worth is also limited by the size of the garment. It turns out that the contested garment solution, the reduced game and the external bargaining process provided by the modiclus have to be carefully knitted together in order to provide the internal share of a player according to the modiclus concept. For the details see Section 6.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model, recall some important deÿnitions and discuss simple properties of excesses. Section 3 exhibits the formation of cartels: the treatment of the various corners of the market is described for markets with a certain weak balancedness property. Under mild additional assumptions the corners of the long side of the market are treated equally and proportional to their total initial assignment. Further results of Section 4 shows that the nucleolus of a certain balanced game describes the amounts given to the players of the remaining corners of the short side.
Section 5 shows that the assumptions employed in the other sections are automatically satisÿed, if the game is "su ciently large." This can be ensured by e.g., by replication of the market.
Furthermore, Sections 6 and 7 exhibit the assignments to the various members of the cartels, re ecting the internal discussion within the cartels.
Finally, Section 8 contains examples and remarks.
Deÿnitions, simple properties
A game, as explained in Section 1, is a triple (I; P; C) satisfying C(∅) = 0. It is not unusual to sloppily use the term just for the coalitional function and not always for the triple. We are predominantly interested in market games or totally balanced games which can be generated from exchange economies [11] . In order to represent such a game we use the representation as a minimum game. That is, C is the minimum of ÿnitely many nonnegative additive set functions (distributions or measures), say 1 ; : : : ; r ∈ R I + , deÿned on P via C(S) = min{ 1 (S); : : : ; r (S)} (S ∈ P). This we write conveniently
According to , every totally balanced game can be represented this way. Their interpretation is that C can be seen as a network game within which players command certain nodes of a network-ow setup. A traditional example is that of a glove game. Here, coalitions need to combine indispensable factors (right-hand and left-hand gloves) in order to acquire utility by selling the product (pairs of gloves) on some external market. We wish to concentrate on the orthogonal case, that is, the carriers of , denoted by C( ) = C ( = 1; : : : ; r), are disjoint. Also we shall assume that I = r =1 C describes a partition of I (each player owns a quantity of one and only one factor). Finally, we assume that there are at least two measures (i.e., r ¿ 2), because for r = 1 the game C is additive. Let us use the term min-game for a game that satisÿes these requirement.
Orthogonality is certainly a restriction within the class of market games. The shape of a min-game appears more drastically, a coalition which completely lacks one factor receives no utility. Thus, players occupy r di erent corners of the market, each one deÿned by possession of a sole factor. The terms corner and carrier are synonyms in this view.
We use the abbreviation M in order to indicate the total mass of , that is, the total initial assignment of goods in corner C , formally
For convenience, the corners of the market are ordered according to total initial assignment, i.e., M 1 6 · · · 6 M r is satisÿed. The min-game C given by (5) is not changed, if every weight i ( = 1; : : : ; r; i ∈ I ) is replaced by the minimum of M 1 and this weight, thus i 6 M 1 is generally assumed. Then the representation of the min-game is unique. Let := |{ ∈ {1; : : : ; r}|M = M 1 }| denote the number of minimal corners. Any coalition S ∈ P decomposes naturally into the coalitions of its partners in the various corners, this we write
with S = S ∩ C ( = 1; : : : ; r):
(We use + instead of ∪ to indicate the union of two coalitions if and only if the coalitions are disjoint.) A further important system of coalitions is provided by the diagonal which is formally given by D := {S ∈ P| (S) = C(S) ( = 1; : : : ; r)}:
A coalition S ∈ D is called a diagonal coalition because the image of S under the vectorvalued measure ( 1 ; : : : ; r ) is located on the diagonal of R r . Economically, diagonal coalitions are e cient, as there is no excess supply of factors available in order to generate C(S): Note that on diagonal sets, C behaves additively. As a consequence, it is not hard to see that any core element x equals the game on the diagonal (x(S) = C(S) (S ∈ D)). In this sense, diagonal coalitions S are also e ective: they can a ord x(S) by their own productive power.
Within the diagonal we are particularly interested in maximal elements. These are diagonal coalitions S such that each corner assembles the maximal possible amount of goods and hence the coalition's worth is C(I ). More precisely, such coalitions satisfy
The system of maximal coalitions is denoted by
The notion of excess is central to the discussion of nucleolus type solution concepts. Given a vector x ∈ R I , recall that the excess of a coalition S ∈ P (cf. Section 1) is
This quantity measures the amount by which coalition S misses its worth C(S), hence is dissatisÿed with x. The maximal excess of C at x is (x; C) := max{e(S; x; C) | S ∈ P}:
The task of computing excesses is a frequently imposed burden; we start out with some versions concerning min-games. An imputation x of a game (I; P; C) is a vector x ∈ R I satisfying Pareto optimality (i.e., x(I ) = C(I )) and individual rationality (i.e., x i ¿ C({i}) (i ∈ I )). If C is the min-game given by (5) then an imputation x satisÿes
thus x i 6 i holds true for any i ∈ C and any corner C . This means that x can be written as
such that the c := (c ) =1; :::; r is a vector of nonnegative coe cients summing up to 1 (the vector of convexifying coe cients) and ( = 1; : : : ; r) are normalized measures, i.e., measures with carriers C , having the same total mass (C ) = M as . Conversely, any vector c of convexifying coe cients together with normalized measures ( = 1; : : : ; r) determines an imputation x by (13). Here is the ÿrst simple Lemma: Lemma 2.1. Let C be a min-game given by (5) and c be a vector of convexifying coe cients. Let x be an imputation of the form
satisfying x i 6 i (i ∈ C ; = + 1; : : : ; r) and let S ∈ P be any coalition:
(1) The excess of S is given by e(S; x; C) = C(S) 
Proof. The equation
implies (16). If 0 6 , then (17) is implied by the equation
The ÿrst part of the lemma emphasizes the rôle of the diagonal, in particular that of the maximal diagonal, in the case that the imputation is a convex combination of the underlying measures. Indeed, it directly implies the following result. Corollary 2.2. Let C and c satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 2.1 and let x be the imputation given by
If S ∈ P is a coalition andS ∈ D is a diagonal coalition satisfying C(S) ¿ C(S), then e(S; x; C) ¿ e(S; x; C)
holds true.
Proof. The inequalities M 1 6 M ( = 1; : : : ; r) directly imply
thus we obtain e(S; x; C) − e(S;
Due to the results of Kohlberg [5] there is a closed connection between a nucleolus type concept and the balanced systems of coalitions it generates via the various levels of excesses. Let us shortly introduce our notion of balancedness. We use a slightly more general version which refers to collections of vectors (and induces the notions for systems of coalitions).
Let S ∈ P; S = ∅ be a coalition. A ÿnite nonempty collection of vectors X ⊆ R S is said to be balanced with respect to z ∈ R S , (or just "balances z") if there is a sequence of balancing coe cients (b x ) x∈X satisfying
Moreover, we shall say that X is just balanced, if it is balanced with respect to (1; : : : ; 1) ∈ R S . Switching to systems of coalitions means to refer to the indicator function. Thus, If S ⊆ P is a nonempty system of coalitions such that S ⊆ T (S ∈ S) is true for some T ∈ P, then we say that S is balanced with respect to T , if the collection {1 S | S ∈ S} balances 1 T . This amounts to the traditional notion. However, in the context of the modiclus, systems of pairs of coalitions are relevant. Indeed, we shall say that a nonempty systemS ⊆ P × P of pairs of coalitions is balanced w.r.t. some coalition U , if the collection {1 R + 1 T |(R; T ) ∈S} balances 1 U . Of course we say that a system of coalitions or a system of pairs of coalitions, respectively, is balanced, if the system balances the grand coalition I .
We are particularly interested in balanced systems that span the corresponding subspace generated by the indicator functions. This is based on the following remark which is due to Sudh olter [14, Remark 2.7] . Remark 2.3. Let X ⊆ R I be a ÿnite collection of vectors and let z ∈ R I . Assume that X balances z. Also, let Y ⊆ R I be a ÿnite collection which contains X. If Y is contained in the linear span of X, then Y balances z as well.
Clearly this remark greatly increases the possibilities of recognizing a system or collection as balanced. For, usually a system we are dealing with is rather large and unaccessible, so the construction of balancing coe cients is quite out of the question. However, the general technique is to single out a subsystem which is balanced and spanning in the above sense. Then the above remark does the job.
The notion of nondegeneracy is introduced as follows (cf. [9] ). A ÿnite collection X ⊆ R I is nondegenerate, if it spans R I . Analogously, a system S of coalitions or a systemS of pairs of coalitions, respectively, is said to be nondegenerate w.r.t. some coalition T , if the collection of corresponding indicators or sums of pairs of indicators, respectively, spans R T and T is the union of all coalitions involved.
Occasionally, we shall also deal with weakly balanced collections. We say that X is weakly balanced, if it allows for a set (b x ) x∈X of weakly balancing coe cients, i.e., the condition b x ¿ 0 in (20) is replaced by b x ¿ 0. Now, as we have mentioned above, some preimputation x (a Pareto optimal vector) of some game C generates certain balanced system via the various levels of excesses. In connection with the modiclus, it turns out that the relevant deÿnitions are useful also when biexcesses are involved.
For ∈ R and any vector x ∈ R I deÿne the system of coalitions with excess at least which is S( ; x; u) := {S ∈ P | e(S; x; u) ¿ }:
Now, as we want to deal with the modiclus, it is actually the notion of biexcesses which matters most. We approach this idea by the analogous deÿnition as follows:
We are now in the position to discuss our solution concept the modiÿed nucleolus or modiclus. The deÿnition has been indicated in the introduction: the modiclus of a game C, denoted by (C), is the unique preimputation that lexicographically minimizes the (ordered) vector of biexcesses. Note that the modiclus is an imputation in the case that it is applied to a min-game. Indeed it must be individually rational by Corollary 2.6 of [14] , because a min-game is zero-monotonic, i.e., C(S ∪ {i}) − C(S) ¿ 0 = C{i} (S ∈ P; i ∈ I ) holds true. Equivalently, it is the projection of the prenucleolus of the dual cover game onto the set of primal players. For the details see [14] .
Theorem 2.4. Let C be a game and let x be a preimputation of this game. Then x = (C) holds true, if and only ifS( ; x; C) is balanced whenever this system is nonempty. A further technique to be employed frequently is provided by the idea of the derived game, which is a relative of the reduced game Â a la Davis-Maschler [2] . Recall that the reduced game v S; x of a game (I; P; C) is deÿned on the powerset of S for any nonempty coalition ∅ = S ⊆ I and a any vector x ∈ R I by
But in the vicinity of the modiclus, the appropriate reduction takes into account both, the game and its dual. Deÿne the derived game with respect to S and x to be the game C S; x on the powerset of S given by
Here we use the abbreviations = (x; C) and ? = (x; C ? ).
Remark 2.6. Let (I; P; C) be a game:
(1) If x is a preimputation, then its projection to any nonempty coalition S belongs to the core of the derived game C S; x . Indeed, for any R ⊆ S with ∅ = R = S the inequalities e(T; x S ; C S; x ) = max
and e(T;
are valid by the deÿnition of the reduced game. Moreover, the equation C S; x (S) = x(S) holds true by Pareto optimality of x.
(2) If C t is the game which arises from C by adding the constant t ∈ R to the worth of every nontrivial coalition, i.e., if C t is deÿned by
then the prenucleoli of C and C t coincide (see Lemma 4.5 in [13] ). (3) The prenucleolus satisÿes the reduced game property (see [12] or [6] ): The projection of the prenucleolus of a game coincides with the prenucleolus of the corresponding reduced game. Of course reduction has to be taken with respect to the prenucleolus.
(4) It is well known that the prenucleolus and the nucleolus coincide, when applied to a game with a nonempty core.
The following lemma will be used in several proofs and can be regarded as an adequate modiÿcation of the reduced game property.
Lemma 2.7. Let C be a game and letx := (C) be its modiclus. Furthermore, let S ∈ P be a nonempty coalition. Then the nucleolus x := (C S;x ) of the derived game coincides with the projection of the modiclus, i.e., x =x S holds true.
Proof. We abbreviate := (x; C) and ? := (x; C ? ). The modiclus of C is the projection to I of the prenucleolus of the dual cover C as deÿned in (4) of Section 1.
Let x denote the prenucleolus of C. Proposition 1.4 in [13] shows that ( x; C) = + ? and
hold true. Let w := C I; x denote this reduced game. By the reduced game property the modiclus of C coincides with the prenucleolus of w. Let u := w S;x denote the reduced game with respect to S. With t := −( + ? ) we obtain u t = C S;x , thus Remark 2.6 completes the proof.
The treatment of corners
During this section let C = { 1 ; : : : ; r } be a min-game. We claim that the modiclus represents the formation of cartels within the various corners of the market. These cartels-or may be their representatives-bargain about their share of the total worth M 1 of the grand coalition. Let x be an imputation represented as in formula (13) of Section 2. As x(C ) = c M 1 holds true, the convexifying coe cients c indicate the share the various corners obtain at x. Similarly, the normalized measure indicates the internal distribution according to x inside a corner .
Within this section, we begin to clarify the shape of the coe cient vector c of the modiclus. It turns out that there are basically three situations depending on the relations of the total initial assignments in the corners in a peculiar way. Accordingly, in the two extreme cases, the modiclus assigns the same share to all corners or just to the minimal ones. In the intermediate case, the modiclus chooses a carefully constructed combination of the two extremes.
The maximal diagonal coalitions play a crucial rôle (cf. (10) of Section 2). If we focus on a corner, we should consider the partners of such coalitions, i.e., the system
We shall impose some conditions (e.g. balancedness) upon this system which allow the computation of maximal excesses and, later on, the determination of the coe cient vector c. This condition is of interest in its own right, however, we shall see in a later section that it is satisÿed for "large games," i.e., for replicated versions or games with "su ciently many" small players.
Lemma 3.1. Assume that D m is weakly balanced w.r.t. C for every ∈ { +1; : : : ; r}. Also, let x be an imputation. Deÿne a further imputationx bỹ
such thatc := x(C )=M 1 ( = 1; : : : ; r) constitute convexifying coe cients. Then
and Proof. By the weak balancedness of D m the system D m of maximal diagonal coalitions is nonempty. Corollary 2.2 implies that the maximal excess with respect to the primal game atx is attained by the coalitions of the system D m . Inserting any coalition of this system into (15) of Lemma 2.1 yields that this excess is indeed the one listed in formula (27) forx.
Furthermore, an inspection of Lemma 2.1 ( (16) and (17)) shows that the maximal excess with respect to the dual game atx is attained at those carriers which have minimal total weight. This shows indeed the equation in formula (27). Of course these carriers have the same weight at x as they have atx. Thus the statement of (28) is veriÿed. Now in order to compare the maximal excess at x and the maximal excess atx we proceed as follows. As D m is weakly balanced for all , we ÿx some and choose balancing coe cients (c R ) R∈D m . Then we obtain the equations
Hence, for some S ∈ D m we have
Thus, the excess of S := r =1 S at x exceeds the one atx, i.e., e(S; x; C) ¿ e(S;x; C) = (x; C):
The ÿnal assertion is as well implied by these considerations. Remark 3.2. It is the aim of the modiclus to minimize the maximal dual excess simultaneously with the maximal excess. With the dual game, the "preventive power" of coalitions enters the scene. Now, in view of formula (28) (and the subsequent proof), it is seen that the maximal dual excess (hence the maximal force of complaints) is attained at the corners with minimal coe cient (share) c . While this is presently proved with respect tox, it will also be true with respect to the modiclus. Clearly, this indicates "the formation of cartels" in the various corners of the market.
Analogously, the fact that the maximal excess is attained at maximal diagonal coalitions points to the maximal "achievement power" of this type of coalitions. This is a consequence of the fact that these coalitions are e cient as well as e ective in the maximal possible fashion. 
and Proof. Formula (30) is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.1. Now we turn to formula (29). Recall that the maximal excess is attained at the elements of D m (Corollary 2.2) which is assumed to be nonempty. In fact, this excess at x is given by (15) of Lemma 2.1, that is, we have
The same formula holds true mutatis mutandis for y. But as the coe cients deÿning y are of the special shape indicated, the formula reduces at once. We introduce c 0 := min{c | = 1; : : : ; r} and obtain
Now the reader has to convince himself that this expression is smaller then the one referring to x (cf. (31)), as the smallest coe cients are attached to the smallest quotients of weights.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that D m is weakly balanced w.r.t. C for every ∈ { + 1; : : : ; r}. Then the following holds true:
then the modiclus treats all corners equally, i.e., is of the form
with a suitable family of normalized measures . (2) If 1 ; : : : ; r satisfy
then the modiclus is of the form
with convexifying coe cients c ( = 1; : : : ; ). In particular, the modiclus is located in the core.
is the case, then the modiclus treats all nonminimal corners equally, and the minimal corners at least as well, i.e.,
Here c +1 = · · · = c r 6 c ( = 1; : : : ; ).
Proof. Putx := (C). By weak balancedness of D m ( = + 1; : : : ; r) both, Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3, may be applied. Indeed, the modiclus is an imputation which minimizes the maximal biexcess. Therefore, we obtain
Thus,
is valid by Pareto optimality. We conclude that 6 M 1 =r holds true. It remains to prove that = M 1 =r or = 0, respectively, holds in the case that (33) or (35), respectively, is satisÿed. In view of (27) and (28), the maximal excesses can be expressed by the two formulae
and
Hence, the maximal biexcess is given by
By the deÿnition of the modiclus this maximal biexcess must be as small as possible. If (33) or (35), respectively, is satisÿed, then the expression in the brackets is negative or positive respectively. Hence has to be maximal (i.e., = M 1 =r holds) in the ÿrst case and it has to be minimal (i.e., = 0 holds) in the latter case.
This way we have now clariÿed the distribution of wealth between the cartels as suggested by the modiclus. It depends crucially on the masses of the initial assignments: if the excess supply on the long side of the market is just moderate (in the sense of formula (33)), then the modiclus treats all corners equally and this is essentially a result of the preventive powers the cartels can exercise (Remark 3.2) . If the excess supply on the long side is overwhelming, the modiclus falls into the core (and the primal maximal excesses are the important quantities). The intermediate case mixes both ingredients.
The determination of the coe cient vector c (i.e., the shares of the cartels)
is not yet complete. The next section continues treating this task. It turns out that the modiclus is determined by the nucleolus of a suitable derived game (Section 2) deÿned on the playerset =1 C , i.e., on the short side.
The derived game on the short side
During this section we ÿx a min-game C = { 1 ; : : : ; r } and continue to discuss the treatment of corners. It turns out that a suitable derived game (cf. (23) of Section 2) deÿned on the short sideS := =1 C of the market allows to further specify the coe cient vector c attached to the modiclus. Since the derived game is a relative of the reduced game and re ects the projection from the dual cover game down onto the original player set, one might expect that the nucleolus enters the scene (recall our explanations in Section 1). Indeed, it is seen that the modiclus can be described employing the nucleolus of a suitable balanced game on the short sideS.
Motivated by Theorem 3.4 we introduce the notion of the index of powers which is the quantity
This index depends on C only as the representation is unique (cf. Section 2). Theorem 3.4 also suggests the classiÿcation of min-games as follows. We say that C has a strong long side or a strong short side, if (33) or (35) of Theorem 3.4, respectively, is satisÿed, i.e., if
respectively, holds true. In the remaining case, i.e., if
holds true, we say that C has balanced sides.
We start out with a strong short side. 
Note that (x; C) = 0 and (x; C ? ) = M 1 hold true. In view of (23) of Section 2 and by (46) it su ces to show that the inequality
is correct for any nontrivial coalition R ⊆S. This inequality follows immediately from (16) and (17) (see Section 2) applied to = .
Now the case of balanced sides is considered. We shall show that, under some additional assumptions, the convexifying coe cients c occurring in (38) of Theorem 3.4 can be determined.
We have to introduce the following concept. such that and put
Then the d are convexifying coe cients and by Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 the maximal excesses are given by the expressions
Hence, the maximal biexcesses atx and at x coincide and can be computed as
The next two steps serve to determine the second highest excesses at x.
Step 3: Let S ∈ P − D m be any coalition which is not a maximal diagonal coalition. We are going to prove that e(S; x; C) 6 (x; C)
holds true. As S ∈ D m two cases may occur:
(2) In the remaining case there exist ; ∈ {1; : : : ; r} with = such that (S) ¿ (S) + min holds true. In this case we conclude via (15) of Lemma 2.1 that e(S; x; C) 6 (x; C) − min M 1 =M r holds true.
Step 4: Let S ∈ P − {C | = s + 1; : : : ; r} be any coalition which is not a nonminimal corner. We are going to prove that e(S; x; C ? ) 6 (x;
holds true. We distinguish two cases:
(1) If S is contained in C for some = + 1; : : : ; r, then we S = C holds true by the assumption. Therefore, the dual excess is given by e(S; x;
If the minimum is M 1 , then (55) follows from the fact that ? 2 ¿ 0 holds true. In the remaining case we obtain e(S; x;
holds true. By (50) this expression yields e(S; x; C ? ) = (x;
The fact that
holds true implies (55) in the current case. (2) If S is not contained in any nonminimal corner, then by Lemma 2.1 ( (16) or (17) applied to = ) it su ces to show that 
hold true. By the assumption S − C is nonempty, thus the inequalities
show (57). Moreover, the observation that 
holds true directly shows (58).
Step 5: In view of the fact that (x; C) − 2 = (x; C ? ) − ? 2 we conclude that e(R; x; C) + e(T; x;
holds true for any pair of coalitions such that R ∈ D m or T ∈ {C | = + 1; : : : ; r}} is satisÿed. By (53) the same property must be satisÿed forx. Indeed, the modiclus In order to describe the modiclus via the nucleolus of a certain game with playerset S in the case that the min-game C has a strong long side or balanced sides an additional assumption is needed. 
In other words, the modiclus coincides with (w) onS and with the measure In view of Lemma 2.7 it su ces to show that the derived game CS ;x coincides with w. For the "trivial" coalitions, i.e., forS and ∅, coincidence is certainly true. Let R ⊆S; ∅ = R =S be a nontrivial coalition and let u 1 := CS ;x and u 2 := (C ? )S ;x be the corresponding reduced games. In view of (27) and (28) of Section 3 we obtain
In order to show that
is satisÿed, let Q ⊆ I −S. An application of (15) 
hold true. Indeed, an application of (16) and (17) of Section 2 in the case = yields 
On the other hand we have
We conclude that (69) and (70) are satisÿed. If r ¿ holds true, then the equation
is satisÿed. Hence, the derived game coincides with w in this case. A game is exact, if any coalition is e ective with respect to some core element. Clearly a min-game is exact, i = r holds true. For an exact min-game inequality (43) is necessarily satisÿed; formally we have a strong long side. In the exact case we obtain G = 1 and H = M 1 , thus Note that the proof of the theorem, when applied to min-games with a strong long side only, does not require the assumption that some maximal corner contains a player of minimal weight.
The internal discussion inside each cartel determines the shape of the solution or rather the shape of each . This goal we approach in Section 6. Within the next section, we explain that the assumptions about balancedness employed so far follow from requirements concerning the size of the game. For "large games" the modiclus behaves as indicated in Theorems 3.4, 4.1 and 4.5.
Large games, balancedness, and nondegeneracy
This section has the character of an interlude. We want to introduce the notion of "large games" in a suitable sense and show that the results of the previous sections indeed clarify the treatment of corners when "many players" (of the smallest type) are present. In fact it will turn out that the t-fold replication of a min-game, the determining measures of which are integervalued and assign weight 1 to at least one player, satisÿes all assumptions employed in the theorems of the subsequent sections, if t is large enough.
In order to simplify the framework, we will tentatively change the notation and replace (C ; ) by (I; ). Thus, we consider a ÿnite set I of cardinality n and a positive measure 0 on I with total weight (I ) = m. Moreover, we ÿx a total ordering ≺ on I satisfying i ¿ j whenever i ≺ j holds true. Throughout this section we shall assume that is integervalued. Also we write max for the maximum of { i | i ∈ I }.
Lemma 5.1. Let p ∈ N satisfy max 6 p 6 (I ). Then the system
is balanced.
Proof. We proceed by induction. If |I | = 1, the requirements imply immediately that I is the unique member of S := S ; ≺;p and the lemma follows. Assume now, that |I | exceeds 1 and the lemma has been veriÿed for all player sets of less cardinality. Moreover, w.l.o.g. assume that I = {1; : : : ; n} and that ≺ is the natural ordering of integers. Let S ∈ S be the lexicographically ÿrst coalition (i.e., collect the largest weights until reaching but not exceeding p). Fix player i ∈ S and consider the following two cases that may occur:
(1) (I − {i}) 6 p. Then I − {i} is an element of S. Moreover, this coalition is the unique element which does not contain i. (2) (I − {i}) ¿ p. Then, by induction hypothesis, the system S i which is obtained on I − {i} using p and the restrictions of and ≺, is balanced. It turns out that S i = {S ∈ S|i ∈ S}. For, the inclusion ⊆ is straightforward. Moreover, ⊇ follows from the fact that every subcoalition of {k ∈ I |k i} has measure less than or equal to p.
Consequently, in both cases, the indicator 1 I −{i} is a positive linear combination of the indicators 1 S (S ∈ S; i ∈ S). Finally, we can write
which proves the lemma. 
are fulÿlled, then the system
is balanced and nondegenerate.
Proof.
Step 1 
We denote by S + p the system on I − J 1 := I + which is obtained via Lemma 5.1 applied to the restriction of , the natural ordering, and p.
By Lemma 5.1 there are balancing coe cients b
By deÿnition of S 
By integration with we conclude that
holds true. Using (77) we obtain that p ¿ 1 −1 holds and, thus, we obtain an estimate
Let q ∈ N now satisfy
and deÿne
We conclude from (74), (77), and (78) that m 1 + (R) ¿ q holds true for any R ∈ S + p , thus the coe cients
are well deÿned. We obtain
with a suitable constant K(p; q) ¿ 0. We want to show that this constant can be estimated. Indeed, for R + T ∈ S p; q , inequality (78) implies that
holds true. By (80) we obtain
Step 2: We are going to apply (85) in the case p = q = M 1 . Indeed, the assumption (74) shows that (81) 
show the assertion.
Let b R+T (R+T ∈ S p; q ) be the coe cients as deÿned in (83) and put ÿ :
shows that y is a positive linear combination of the indicators of the system
Moreover, ¡ 1 holds, because L ¡ 1 is valid. The deÿnition of p and q implies that T is a subset of Q M 1 .
Step 4: The third system of coalitions that will be used is the set R which is deÿned as follows. For any i ∈ I + deÿne the system R (i) and R by
and R = i∈I + R (i) . Here the natural notation S + = {S ∩ I + |S ∈ S} is used. Let b + R (R ∈ S + ) be balancing coe cients of this system. Condition (74) implies that
holds true, thus the coe cients
are well deÿned. Similarly to (84) it is seen that
holds. Summing up the vectors x (i) and normalizing yields
Hence, we have shown that z can be expressed as a positive linear combination of the indicators of the system R (i) ⊆ Q M 1 .
Step 5: Put Q := R∪S∪T. The last three steps show that Q is, indeed, a subsystem of Q M 1 . In view of Remark 2.3 it su ces to show that Q is balanced and nondegenerate.
In view of the fact that K ¿ 1 holds true, we can ÿnd 1 ¿ ¿ 0 such that K − (K −K) ¿ 1 is true. Thenx := (1 − )x + z can be expressed as
with a suitable 0 6 K ¡ 1. Moreover, the equation
shows that Q is balanced, because the coe cients are strictly positive. Now we turn to nondegeneracy. The vectors x and y can be used to show that 1 I + and 1 J1 are spanned by the indicators of Q. Additionally using the
deÿned in (89) shows that every indicator 1 {i} (i ∈ I + ) as well belongs to the span. Then pick any i ∈ I + and any coalition R ∈ S + which contains i. All indicators 1 T satisfying R − {i} + T ∈ R (i) are spanned. The corresponding coalitions are exactly those subsets of J 1 that possess the cardinality M 1 − (R) + i . This cardinality is, by (74), strictly less than m 1 and, by deÿnition of S + ; it is strictly positive. Therefore 1 {i} (i ∈ J 1 ) is spanned. Now we draw the conclusions of our results. To this end, we return to the original setup within which we deal with a min-game. Recall that the shape of the modiclus (with respect to the coe cients determining the share of the cartels) was clariÿed in Sections 3 and 4. We want to show that the conditions employed are satisÿed if there are su ciently many small players present.
For ∈ N, the t-fold replication of any measure is denoted by (t) . Likewise, I
is used for the t-fold replication of I . Thus, we assume that the t-fold replication of the game (I; P; C), denoted by (I (t) ; P (t) ; C (t) ) is a concept well known to the reader.
Corollary 5.3. Let C = { 1 ; : : : ; r } be an integer valued min-game. Assume that, for some ¿ , there is at least one player with weight 1 in corner C . Then there is t 0 ∈ N such that for any t ¿ t 0 with respect to the replicated game C (t) the system of partners of maximal diagonal coalitions, i.e., the system
Proof. Given , let k be a player with weight 1 in corner . We appeal to Theorem 5.2 which will be applied to C (t) ; (t) and tM 1 .
To be more precise, we have (C − {j}) ¿ M 1 and hence, for any natural t, we have (t) (C (t) − J 1 ) ¿ tM 1 where J 1 is the coalition of all t copies of player k. Thus, using = (t) for the moment, condition (73) is satisÿed for all t ∈ N. Now, the right-hand term in (74) is clearly bounded in t. For, tm + as well as tM 1 increase linearly and max j∈C (t) j does not change with t. therefore, if |J 1 | = t is large enough, Eq. (74) will be satisÿed. Similarly, the left-hand side in (75) equals t 2 while the right-hand side again increases linearly. It is now obvious how to choose the desired bound t 0 in order to ensure the statement of Theorem 5.2. Thereafter, it satisÿes to realize that Q tM 1 as deÿned in (76) equals the system of partners we are concerned with, that is (91). (2) The index of relative powers, i.e., the quantity -(C) (cf. formula (42) of Section 4) is preserved under replication. This means that a min-game possesses a strong long side, a strong short side, or balanced sides, respectively, if and only if this property holds for any replicated game.
(3) It is not hard to see that another procedure can be implemented which also preserves the index of relative powers and ensures that Theorem 3.4 holds true eventually. One can add players of weight 1 in large numbers to each corner. This way the mass relations can be kept constant and again it is possible to show that the balancedness as well as the nondegeneracy condition (see Theorem 5.2) is ensured after ÿnitely many steps. The proof is actually much easier and we will not dwell on this subject excessively. We refer to this procedure by adding small players.
(4) We shall say that an integervalued min-game { 1 ; : : : ; r } is large, if D m is balanced and nondegenerate, C contains a player of weight 1 ( = + 1; : : : ; r), and ( 1 ; : : : ; r ) allows matches.
Corollary 5.5. Let C = { 1 ; : : : ; r } be an integer valued min-game. Assume that, for all ¿ , there is at least one player with weight 1 in corner C . Then both, replication and adding small players, generate large games after ÿnitely many steps. Hence, the assertions of all theorems of Sections 3 and 4 are valid.
The VIP formula and a bankruptcy problem
Within this section we restrict ourselves to min-games C = { 1 ; : : : ; r } satisfying the following conditions: 
Given integervalued measures, (93) is equivalent to the condition that every natural number smaller than or equal to M is the weight of some coalition with respect to . Also, (93) yields min = 1 and ensures that the long side shows small players (cf. Deÿnition 4.2).
Given these assumptions, we are going to classify the behavior ofx := (C) by a formula involving the shape of the initial assignments represented by 1 . First of all Theorems 3.4, 4.3 and 4.5 completely determine the shape of the modiclus restricted to the union of nonminimal corners I −S. HereS = =1 C is the short side of the market as in Section 4. Moreover, these theorems determine the vector c of convexifying coe cients given by c M 1 =x(C ) for any = 1; : : : ; r. As a consequence, for any player in C 2 ; : : : ; C the modiclus is completely determined by the equal treatment property (see [14] ).
Imagine a situation in which the modiclusx is agreed upon by the bargaining process of the representatives of the various cartels (corners), and hence is externally ÿxed. As in Section 5, for the sake of the internal discussion, we will tentatively replace corner C 1 by I -this will now be the player set. The initial assignment 1 will be replaced by and because of the external in uence the players will have to agree on the distribution of M 1 −x( r =2 C ). This quantity is now replaced by a positive real E. Which kind of "internal game" should we have in mind in order to discuss the bargaining process inside the cartel C 1 ? Of course players will internally argue with their strength in the global game C given the modiclus (which is ÿxed on the corners outside). These arguments may formally be based on the quantity
for i ∈ C 1 . That is, player i points to coalitions he could form with partners (who are already assigned a deÿnite share by the modiclus based on the uniform distribution in their corner). Player i could try to join these partners at the same conditions and then he would get the surplus. In view of Lemma 2.1 and Corollary 2.2 we expect this quantity to be maximal, when player i attempts to form diagonal coalitions (the excess appears more or less in Eq. (94)). Now, based onx and the coe cient c of corner C , we compute for player k ∈ C the payo
Hence, the quantity speciÿed in (94) when {i} + T is diagonal turns out to be
This quantity is now abbreviated by
Note that E 6 ÿ 1 (C 1 ) can be veriÿed. Let us focus on a player set I , a measure and positive real numbers E and ÿ satisfying E 6 ÿ (I ). Each player enters the discussion with a "claim" based on his external possibilities. This claim is given by i ÿ. However, the total of claims, i.e. ÿ (I ) (weakly) exceeds the "estate" E that can be allotted at all inside the cartel. This kind of problem is well known in the literature and was ÿrst discussed by AumannMaschler [1] who treat a bankruptcy problem that appears already in the Talmud. In this context, the data ÿ i appear as "debts" of the estate towards the contestants. The game w derived from this problem is given by
and re ects a pessimistic attitude: If the opposing coalition I − S successfully leaves booking its claims, the remainder towards E is what is left for coalition S to distribute. The solution concept mentioned in the Talmud according to Aumann-Maschler is the "contested garment consistent solution" (the CG-solution). It coincides with the nucleolus of the corresponding game w (the CG-game).
The solution concept one might adopt is, therefore, suggested by the procedure developed in [1] . In the present context, we are going to introduce this concept as follows.
Imagine that a quantity of ÿ i =2 is guaranteed to each of the players. This is the average of his individually rational payo (which is 0) in the global game C and the aspiration in the endogenous game of the cartel. Now the rich players have to pay a constant fee and the poor ones are allotted ÿ i =2. Who is considered to be rich and who is poor depends on the size of the fee which is determined by the requirement i∈I max ÿ i − ;
Thereafter, if (E; ÿ) is the (unique) solution of (96), the labels "rich" and "poor" can immediately be allotted. The smallest rich player is the one, say k 0 , such that k0 − (E; ÿ) just exceeds or equals (ÿ k0 )=2 and k0+1 − (E; ÿ) is below (ÿ k0+1 )=2.
To have a nice term, we call the rich players in this context the VIPs. The ÿnal formula arising eventually for the modiclus of the corner with big chunks of initial assignments will be called the VIP formula.
Remark 6.1. Recall that the total mass is (I )= : m. Now, for ÿm ¿ E ¿ ÿm=2, it is not too hard to see that (96) indeed admits of a unique solution (E; ÿ) ¿ 0. Now we are going to present the endogenous solution in a precise manner. The result will be called the E-ÿ-CG measure. Deÿnition 6.2. Let E; ÿ be real numbers. Assume that (E; ÿ) satisÿes 0 ¡ ÿ and ÿ 2 m ¡ E 6 ÿm:
Deÿne the real number (E; ÿ) by the requirement
and the E-ÿ-CG measure x (E; ÿ) by
and E can be written as
is valid. Therefore,
holds true. Moreover (106) is also valid in the case that C has balanced sides. Indeed, in this case ÿ and E are given by
thus (106) is valid even with strict inequalities in this case. Hence, the pair (E; ÿ) satisÿes condition (97) and the quantity (E; ÿ) and the E-ÿ-CG measure x (E; ÿ) are well deÿned. Of course we apply the corresponding deÿni-tions to the ÿnite set C 1 and to the restriction of 1 to C 1 . In what follows the measure x (E; ÿ) on C 1 is as well considered as a measure on I with carrier C 1 whenever this is needed.
Theorem 6.5. The modiclus of C is the imputation given by
Proof. By Theorems 3.4, 4.3, 4.5 and Corollary 2.6 of [14] the modiclus (C)= :x has the desired form, when restricted to I − C 1 . Let w be the bankruptcy game with player set C 1 deÿned by
By Remark 6.4 x := x (E; ÿ) is the nucleolus of w (see [1] ). In view of Lemma 2.7 it su ces to show that w coincides with the derived game C C 1 ;x . For the trivial coalitions, coincidence is certainly true. Let R ⊆ C 1 ; ∅ = R = C 1 be a nontrivial coalition and let u 1 := C C 1 ;x and u 2 := (C ? ) C 1 ;x be the corresponding reduced games. In view of (27) and (28) of Section 3 we obtain
is satisÿed let Q ⊆ I − C 1 . An application of (15) of Section in 2 yields
thus C(R + Q) −x(Q) 6 1 (R)ÿ holds true as well as
On the other hand the measures allow matches. Take coalitions Q ⊆ C ( = 2; : : : ; r) satisfying (Q ) = 1 (R), deÿne Q := r = +1 Q and note that (112) is now, in fact, an equation. We conclude that (111) is satisÿed. Now let Q ⊆ I − C 1 be a coalition. Lemma 2.1 ((16) and (17) applied to = 1) implies that
and, thus,
hold true. On the other hand we obtain
thus u 2 (R) ¿ 0 is valid. Hence, it su ces to show that
holds true. By (63) of Section 4 (with min = 1) we obtain r 6 1, thus inequality (114) implies that
holds true. Eq. (111) together with (115) show that
A strong short side
In this section, we discuss the modiclus of a min-game with a strong short side. Under some conditions it coincides with the barycenter of the measures on the short side. This means that the modiclus equals the nucleolus of the exact game generated by the measures on the short side. The preliminary result, therefore, deals with the nucleolus of exact min-games. Next, we show that the nucleolus and the modiclus of an exact min-game coincide, if and only if the nucleolus treats all corners equally. Recall that a min-game C = { 1 ; : : : ; r } is exact, i = r holds true.
Theorem 7.1. Let C = { 1 ; : : : ; r } be an exact min-game and let ( = 1; : : : ; r) be integervalued. Denote by C 1 := {i ∈ C | i = 1} and assume that, for all = 1; : : : ; r, the condition
is satisÿed. Then the nucleolus is the barycenter of the measures involved, i.e.,
Step 1: We are going to show that the coalitions of maximal excess form a balanced system. Moreover, we show the same fact for the coalitions of second largest excess and prove that this system is nondegenerate. This su ces in view of Remarks 2.5 and 2.3. First of all we discuss the maximal excess with respect to x. Since the game is exact and x is in the core, this excess is 0 and it is attained exactly on diagonal sets. Note that the system D of diagonal sets is easily recognized to be balanced, as the complement of a diagonal set is diagonal as well.
Step 2: We turn to the second largest excess. Note that, in view of Eq. (116), there is at most one corner C with C 1 = ∅. If so, we assume without loss of generality that this is the ÿrst corner. Now, for every j ∈ C 1 ( = 2; : : : ; r) the excess of {j} turns out to be −1=r. Next, let S be an arbitrary coalition which is not diagonal. Then there are corners and such that (S) ¿ C(S) = (S) holds true. Then the excess is
Consequently, the second largest excess is −1=r. 
Examples and remarks
Within this section we present a few examples. In particular, these examples show that some conditions used in the theorems are crucial. We start out with an exact game. In the following example the nucleolus is not the barycenter of the measures involved and neither does it coincide with the modiclus. Clearly this is at variance with Theorem 7.1, the conditions of which are not satisÿed. The arising min-game C has a strong long side. However, in contrast to Theorem 3.4, the modiclus does not yield equal treatment of the corners. Indeed, we claim that (C) = 1 5 (8; 3; 3; 2; 2; 2) holds true. Indeed, the corners C 2 and C 3 are the only coalitions attaining maximal dual excess, whereas the maximal primal excess is attained by all coalitions containing 1 member of each corner and by all coalitions containing 1 member of the minimal and 2 members of each of the other corners. It can be checked that the pairs of coalitions of maximal biexcess form a nondegenerate and balanced system. Remark 8.6. (1) In case k ¿ 25 the modiclus of the game deÿned in Example 8.4 is concentrated to the ÿrst corner. Hence the "region" in which the modiclus guarantees equal treatment of the corners, is just much larger than in the case of the presence of weakly balanced D m ( = + 1; : : : ; r). We conjecture that the corresponding assertion (1) of Theorem 3.4 remains true, if "weak balancedness" is replaced by "nonemptiness."
(2) The t-fold replication of the game in Example 8.4 satisÿes the balancedness and nondegeneracy property of D m2(t) whenever t ¿ 2, thus Theorems 3.4 and 4.3 can be applied in the replicated case.
(3) It should be noted that the modiclus of the t-fold replication of the game deÿned in Example 8.5 coincides with the barycenter of the measures involved, if t is su ciently large. However, balancedness and nondegeneracy of D m (t) ( = 2; 3) are only satisÿed in the case that t is a multiple of 3.
(4) Finally it should be remarked that the modiclus treats the corners equally in the case that only two corners are present. In this case, no further conditions have to be satisÿed in order to guarantee this kind of "equal treatment property" among corners. For a proof see [15] .
